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Disputationer 2001

Ulf Linderfalk

Om tolkning av traktater

Datum för disputation: 21 oktober 2001
Fakultetsopponent: professor Lauri Hannikainen
Ämne: folkrätt


In the relations between states interpretation of treaties is an everyday issue. When an agent of state confers a meaning on a treaty text, the ensuing interpretation is talked of as being legally either correct or incorrect. This is a distinction made possible thanks to the existence of certain norms. These are the norms which find expression in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, articles 31-33. Articles 31-33 not only put into words the legal relations created by the Convention between those states, in regard to those treaties, for which the Convention formally is to be applied. They are also expressive of the relations that exist under international customary law between states in general. This is today generally accepted.

To explain fully what distinguishes an interpretation which is legally correct from one which is not, it is then necessary that we come to grips with the content of Vienna Convention articles 31-33. In legal literature the substance of these articles has often been described by reference to the means of interpretation therein authorized, and little more than that. As I see it more detail is required. On closer inspection it is obvious that the content of Vienna Convention articles 31-33 need to be described in more coherent ways. What the articles express is a system of rules, whereby agents are not only given notice of the different means that law can be said to approve for the purpose of interpretation, but are also instructed how the means are to be used - separately as well as jointly - so that a conclusion can be reached on the meaning of a treaty text.

The purpose of my dissertation is twofold. Firstly, in chapter 2, by importing knowledge from linguistics, and pragmatics in particular, I start out by describing in general terms what in this context is meant by a rule of interpretation. A model is put forward giving a representation of the concept as such. Secondly, in chapters 3 through 11, drawing on the model established, I proceed by defining and articulating the content of public international law. In conclusion - making quick references possible - I present a list of 44 rules, all of which can be made valid either on the basis of the Vienna articles on interpretation directly, or by reference to the customary rules that the Vienna articles are supposed to reproduce.

Ewa Gustafsson

Missbrukare i rättsstaten: En rättsvetenskaplig stu-die om lagstiftningen rörande tvångsvård av vuxna missbrukare

Datum för disputation: den 21 september 2001
Fakultetsopponent: professor Asbjörn Kjönstad
Ämne: offentlig rätt


The Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act (1988:870) - LVM - gives society the right, and the obligation, to deprive an individual of his liberty on grounds of ongoing abuse of alcohol, narcotics or volatile solvents. In addition, legislation gives the authorities the right to make body search and superficial personal search, to control mail and other deliveries, and the right to further restrict the freedom during periods of involuntary care. In this thesis The Governmental Act and The European Convention on the Protection of Human Right and Basic Freedoms are the fundament of the description and analyses of LVM. The object of the dissertation is to ascertain, partly how the authorities have applied the law and partly if the application is in accordance with the law and the fundamental demands of the individual´s legal security. The investigation shows that the form of the basic regulation on involuntary intervention should be criticized from several points of view. The conclusion is that the legislation does not protect individuals from discretionary or arbitrary acts.