Gregor Noll

Negotiating Asylum. The EU acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection

Datum för disputation: den 23 september 2000
Fakultetsopponent: professor Richard Plender
Ämne: folkrätt

Abstract

Hur tillgängligt är EU för asylsökande? Står Unionens rättsregler i strid med folkrätten? Om så är fallet, hur löser vi konflikten dem emellan? Besitter vi alls medel för att lösa grundläggande konflikter om hur långt rätten skall skydda "utomstående"? Denna avhandling söker svar på frågorna genom att kombinera formaljuridik med statsvetenskapliga förklaringsmodeller. Migrations- och asylrätt slits mellan ett universalistiskt och ett partikularistiskt synsätt, vilket genomsyrar lagstiftnings- och tolkningsfrågor. Medan formaljuridiken är tillräckligt kraftfull för att lösa mindre och specifika konflikter (t ex viseringskravens laglighet i enstaka fall), står den handfallen inför rättsfrågor som för med sig stora krav på resurser (t ex om viseringskrav är diskriminerande överhuvud).

Som bakgrund inför analysen presenteras såväl EU:s instrument - den så kallade acquin - och folkrättens normer. Det visar sig att centrala instrument i Unionens migrations- och asylpolitik kan strida mot folkrätten. Viseringskrav kan i enstaka fall medföra brott mot Europakonventionen. Vidare gör en folkrättskonform tolkning av Dublinkonvention och Spanska Protokollet att deras ursprungliga kontrollfunktion går förlorad. Å andra sidan förblir det oklart huruvida viseringsförpliktelser i sig utgör diskriminering, eller om staterna är rättsligt förpliktade att hjälpa varandra ta emot skyddssökande. Denna oklarhet kan inte avhjälpas genom hänvisningar till statssuveränitet eller mänskliga rättigheters universalitet, eftersom folkrätten lämnar frågan om den enas företräde inför den andra obesvarad. Avhandlingens sista del handlar om demokratins paradox - beslut om uteslutning fattas odemokratiskt. Till sist analyseras Europadomstolen som det demokratiskt mest legitimerade forum för att förhandla fram skydd för flyktingar.

In English

How are access to asylum and other forms of extraterritorial protection regulated in the European Union? Is the EU acquis in these areas in conformity with international law? What tools does international law offer to solve conflicts between them? And, finally, is law capable of bridging the foundational oppositions embedded in migration and asylum issues? This work combines the potential of legal formalism with an analytical framework drawing on political theory. It analyses the argumentative strategies used by international lawyers, exploiting the interpretative methodology of international law as well as elaborate discrimination arguments.

Taking the axiomatic tension between universalism and particularism as a point of departure, the author conceptualises the efforts to harmonise migration and asylum law in the European Union as the result of two interdependent negotiation loops: one taking place among Member States, and another between protection seekers and their host state. An extensive survey of the EU acquis and its institutional framework leads to the conclusion that both are heavily fragmented. The EU acquis contains not a single binding instruments securing the interests of protection seekers, while instruments enhancing migration control are fraught with legal and practical idiosyncrasies. Burden-sharing remains the pivotal element in the normative dynamics behind the EU acquis, and the various efforts of Member States to launch solidarity schemes are exposed to a critical analysis.

After confronting the acquis with protective norms of international law, the author concludes that the deflection of protection seekers by means of visa requirements may constitute a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, and that the prescriptions of international law oblige Member States to apply the Dublin Convention and the Spanish Protocol in a manner which ultimately empties the law of its main control functions. He also develops an explicatory model reconstructing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of extraterritorial protection. In the final part, the argumentative interdependencies between universalism and particularism are explored, and the author explains why the European Court of Human Rights must be regarded as the most legitimized forum for the negotiation of asylum in Europe.

Christian Dahlman

Konkurrerande culpakriterier

Datum för disputation: den 6 september 200
Fakultetsopponent: professor Svein Eng
Ämne: allmän rättslära

Abstract

Skadeståndsrätten innehåller alternativa definitioner på culpa. Den innehåller tre konkurrerande culpakriterier. Enligt normalitetskriteriet föreligger culpa om den som orsakat en skada inte har vidtagit de försiktighetsåtgärder som en normalt aktsam person hade vidtagit i motsvarande situation. Enligt det ekonomiska kriteriet föreligger culpa om skadan hade kunnat förhindras med en åtgärd som hade varit mindre kostsam än de skador den hade förebyggt. Enligt trygghetskriteriet föreligger culpa om skadan berodde på en säkerhetsbrist som ger upphov till oacceptabelt stor otrygghet.

Konkurrerande culpakriterier är en undersökning av hur dessa tre kriterier tillämpas och hur konflikter mellan dem löses. Boken preciserar innehållet i gällande rätt och skapar förståelse för de rättspolitiska övervägande som döljer sig bakom skadeståndsrätten.

In English

The concept of negligence in tort law can be defined in (at least) three different ways. Negligence can be defined in terms of normality, i.e. as failing to act in accordance with custom or failing to meet the level of care taken by normally careful citizens. It can be defined in terms of efficiency. In that case it would mean refraining from taking a precaution that costs less to take than it saves through accident prevention. And it can be defined in terms of safety, implying that the defendant has been negligent if he has exposed the plaintiff to an unacceptable risk.

These three definitions are incompatible. They rest on rival moral theories and conflicting political ideals. The normality criterion of negligence is conservative. It rests on the ideal that the norms in the legal system should be guided by the norms shaped by civil society. The efficiency criterion is neo-liberal. It rests on the standpoint that the purpose of tort law is to promote wealth. The safety criterion is orientated towards a more socialistic form of liberalism. It rests on the view that tort law should redistribute wealth to secure welfare.

In spite of their apparent incoherence these three negligence criteria are used side by side in Swedish tort law. In some cases the Swedish supreme court judges the defendant's behaviour according to one criteria and in other cases according to another criteria. This might seem disturbing, but the way conflicts between the criteria are resolved can be observed to follow a clearcut pattern. If the defendant has caused the accident in his private life he will only be held responsible if he has acted with negligence according to the normality criterion. If the defendant is a company or a government body it will be held responsible if it has acted with negligence according to the normality criterion or the efficieny criterion. If it has caused an injury to the plaintiff's person it is also responsible if it has acted with negligence according to the safety criterion.

Per Nilsén

Att stoppa munnen till på bespottare och underrätta andra – Den akademiska undervisningen i svensk statsrätt under frihetstiden

Datum för disputation: den 6 juni 2000
Fakultetsopponent: professor Lars Björne
Ämne: rättshistoria

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to study the education in constitutional law during the period 1719-1772, a period known as the Age of Liberty. According to the Instruments of Government 1719/1720, the actual power in the state was vested in the Diet, consisting of the four estates, all equal in voting matters. The royal will was bound to the majority in the State Council, its members beeing responsible to the Diet. Due to royal opposition and the singular construction of the constitution, it was early felt necessary to educate university students in the fundamental laws. Theocratic views were condemned and natural law with its social contract was, more or less, adopted as a state ideology. Ordinances prescribing and regulating this education were issued in 1723, 1747, 1755 and 1757. The education is studied from three aspects: 1. Decision-making and control, 2. Function, 3. Contents. It is shown, that the education in Swedish constitutional law was mainly a mean of the ruling majority in the Diet to influence the training of future loyal civil servants. In the 1750s an extensive propaganda programme was launched by the parliamentary majority in order to influence the public opinion outside the universities. It was said, that the knowledge of the fundamental laws was the right of every citizen. In 1766, censorship was abolished and a political discussion was made possible. The ideas presented in the education were mainly of German origin, although Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" had partly been translated in 1726. Because of the peculiarity of the Swedish constitution , foreign ideas - especially those advocating a strong royal authority - were looked upon with suspicion. Contrary to the University statutes, the education was placed in the law faculites, since the law professors were believed to be less inclined to philosophical speculations than their colleagues at the faculties of philosophy. The only exception was the University of Greifswald where the services of the loyal university librarian were used in order to give the Pomeranian youth a politically correct view of the Swedish constitution. Thanks to his officially approved translations, the Swedish fundamental laws were made obtainable to the German speaking readers.

Uta Bindreiter

Why Grundnorm? A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine

Datum för disputation: den 3 juni 2000
Fakultetsopponent: professor Kaarlo Tuori
Ämne: allmän rättslära

Abstract

The treatise is concerned with the source-—the “Grund”--of the bindingness of law. I contend, first, that the “presupposition” of the basic norm, on a certain reading of Kelsen’s doctrine, can be understood as constituting a normative source of positive law, and, secondly, that this reading of Kelsen admits of addressing the issue of the (formal) legitimacy of supra-national and “directly applicable” rules and other norms.

The issue of the basic norm problematic is addressed by posing and answering three questions, namely: (1) Who presupposes the basic norm? (2) Is it possible to defend the presupposition in a way that is convincing? and (3) What difference does the presupposition make? From taking up and applying doctrines that are drawn from inquiries into what H.L.A. Hart called the “internal aspect” of rules, it becomes clear that internality-—in Kelsenian parlance: the “juristic consciousness”-—is ambivalent in itself and that the ultimate measure of legal argumentation is the legal audience. In the final section of the treatise, I shift perspective: Investigating into the reasons that underlie the risk of conflict inherent in the relationship between the European Court of Justice and authoritative national courts, I argue that the normative “ground” suggested in Part Two--the presupposition of the basic norm as a "Grund" for legal argumentation--is affected, in our times, by the inclusion of democracy.